I am pleased to have the chance to respond to David Imbroscio's critique of urban policy. He gives the readers of the Journal of Urban Affairs a chance to think about the significance of communities we often devalue and the potential costs of urban policy that favors residential mobility-specifically extra-urban "moves to opportunity." To be clear, however, he does this by implying a futuristic thought experiment that assumes the researchers who study residential mobility programs, the mobility paradigm (MP), have somehow gotten control of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and turned it inside out. In the face of this research hegemony, he advocates that we return to a placemaking paradigm (PP) that focuses on community building and bringing resources to urban neighborhoods, instead of bringing families to neighborhoods with resources. I am glad we get to talk honestly about urban policies, as we clearly have not gotten it right yet. However, I am afraid that Imbroscio's paper is part of an emerging literature that has the potential to do more harm than good by distracting us with research caricatures and a false dichotomy between policies that could be mutually beneficial. I must preface this commentary by saying that I have been implicated as part of the MP, and as such, it might be difficult to comment on Imbroscio's paper without sounding like part of the MP.
HOUSING RESEARCHERS WITH ULTERIOR MOTIVES?
Then again, maybe it is not that hard. As others have noted in already published critiques of Imbroscio's work (Briggs, 2008; Goering & Feins, 2008) , no researchers believe that assisted residential mobility is the sole solution to overcoming the serious challenges faced by families in our poorest urban neighborhoods. It is unfortunate that Imbroscio's new paper once again implies a mobility-only agenda among a subset of housing researchers. When I gave my first talk about the long-term outcomes of Chicago's Gautreaux families, I was faced with this question from the audience: "Scaling up a program like Gautreaux will never work. Why not consider alternatives like community development programs?" Back then, as still happens now, people confuse the research interests and empirical findings of scholars with their prescriptions for how things should be. We housing scholars are social scientists, not evangelists. What do we have to personally gain from studying mobility programs and disseminating our results to wider audiences, relative to any other potentially successful program that might help families? Many of these mobility programs have had mixed results and none of us has lied about them. None of the social scientists I know intend to promote programs that do not work, or advocate throwing good money after bad. Imbroscio implies that there is an ulterior motive for the work we do, and I cannot see what that is.
I can say that the strongest motive I have for doing research on assisted mobility programs is that it helps me answer important policy questions like: What is possible? What works (and why)? What does not work (and why)? What do families need, and what are current policies or programs lacking? Programs like Gautreaux, Moving to Opportunity (MTO), and the more recent Baltimore Thompson program I am studying are rare and valuable opportunities to understand how families fare when presented with changes in the opportunity structure. Decades of observational social science have demonstrated an empirical relationship between concentrated poverty and diminished life outcomes, but cannot say much about what might happen if these same families escaped disadvantaged and dangerous neighborhoods (see DeLuca & Dayton, 2009 ). This is not about a cadre of academics promoting a narrow and limited policy option to further middle class values (Imbroscio, 2008) . This is not about academics telling only the "clean" side of the story that suits their agenda. Briggs, Popkin, and Goering (2010) talk as much about the challenges and pitfalls of mobility programs as they do about any of their benefits.
1 This is about serious scholars trying to understand how policies do or do not work when they intersect with the lives of real families.
THE OTHER IMPORTANT THINGS MOBILITY PROGRAMS HAVE ACCOMPLISHED
In terms of the research output, Imbroscio has rightly pointed out that we have not cured urban poverty through assisted voucher programs, a conclusion that I have repeatedly also noted in my own work with colleagues on MTO and Gautreaux (e.g., DeLuca & Rosenblatt, 2010; DeLuca, Duncan, Mendenhall, & Keels 2010) . However, as he accuses the MP of doing, Imbroscio cherry picks the findings he presents, and emphasizes those best suited for his argument (see Goetz & Chapple, 2010 for a similar angle). Although he correctly states that there were mixed results from MTO and that Gautreaux was not an experiment, he underplays key findings from both programs. I will choose two to demonstrate this. First, on Gautreaux, Imbroscio does not mention the fact that 15-20 years after getting housing assistance and counseling from the program, most African American families who moved to more affluent, safer, more integrated neighborhoods were still living in similar communities (DeLuca & Rosenbaum, 2003; Keels, Duncan, DeLuca, Mendenhall, & Rosenbaum, 2005) . When their children grew up and moved on their own, they lived in nonpoor, integrated neighborhoods too (Keels, 2008) . Although the design is not experimental (all families moved, so there was no control group), it is certainly stronger than traditional observational research designs. We capitalized on the variation in neighborhood locations for families who moved with Gautreaux (about half to mostly White affluent areas and about half to mixed or mostly Black neighborhoods) and found that this variation in neighborhood context strongly predicted where families lived over a decade later. If that is not convincing alone, one can consider a plausibility test, as Shadish, Cook, and Campbell (2002) advise when you cannot rule out all potential confounds. Here goes: To believe that these long-term results are not a function of families' receiving the counseling and opportunity they got with Gautreaux, one would also have to believe that several thousand low-income Black families moved from public housing projects (or similar neighborhoods) to low-crime, mostly White suburban neighborhoods on their own in the 1970s and stayed there for almost two decades. Although possible, decades of demographic observations would suggest otherwise, as their counterparts in the Section 8 program were living in neighborhoods that were about as segregated as public housing projects.
2
On MTO, Imbroscio correctly states that experimental movers did not reap the economic and educational benefits that the MP had hoped for. However, what he glosses over is the fact that women (both mothers and daughters) who left the housing projects for safer neighborhoods experienced improvements in their mental health on par with best practices in antidepressant medication therapies (Kling, Liebman, & Katz, 2007) . When pharmaceutical companies, like Lilly or Pfizer, achieve these kinds of results, it is celebrated in the news. But because one of the only conclusive benefits of MTO was noneconomic, the program is written off as a failure and proof that neighborhoods do not matter. Imbroscio notes that "dispersal programs" have been ineffective for enhancing economic opportunity. I will add that it is also true that mobility programs did not solve the national dropout crisis for minority boys and send them to Harvard. But young men who moved to the suburbs with Gautreaux were also more likely to live longer and less likely to be murdered (Votruba & Kling, 2009 ). This leads me to a larger point, one that goes beyond Imbroscio's article and applies to the reception of social science research results more generally by the media, policymakers, and the public. As a society we need to think about what counts as worthwhile outcomes from any public policy investment. If we completely dismiss the empirically supported benefits of mobility efforts, we are also in danger of saying that the right to leave violent segregated neighborhoods, the safety of poor families, the mental health of low-income women, and the mortality of young men are not outcomes that meet our standards for important social change.
On the potential scope of mobility, there is another point worth making. Imbroscio is concerned that the MP are promoting mobility remedies that will cause population level instability. However, we have no idea whether a larger mobility program would result in metropolitan instability because we have never tried it. The ones we have tried have been relatively limited in scope. For example, the Baltimore metropolitan region has over 600,000 people. There were 636 families in the MTO program; 252 were given low-poverty vouchers; half of those leased up in nonpoor neighborhoods. The same small fractions obtain in other mobility programs. The irony of Imbroscio's claim that mobility programs would destabilize communities is that poor families are already moving excessively and their neighborhoods are already unstable. Poor housing quality and the decisions of landlords force families to move frequently, unpredictably, and under duress (DeLuca, Rosenblatt, & Wood, 2011) . In fact, I have found that more than 80% of the relocations that low-income Black families make in the course of their lives are involuntary . Residential instability is more likely to be caused by the poor quality of existing housing stock, perverse policy incentives, delinquent landlords, and the violence that exists in these neighborhoods, than it is from mobility programs.
MOBILITY PARADIGM AS POLICY: FALSE ALARM
But let us take a step back and examine what federal housing policy actually looks like before we get worried that the MP has taken over. As it stands, HUD's stated mission is to: "Create strong, sustainable, inclusive communities and quality, affordable homes for all." This is not a mission of mobility per se. Even HUD's strategic plan, which does include a subgoal of enhancing mobility, is mostly focused on helping homeowners, connecting families to resources in their neighborhoods, and building communities. There is considerable focus on Choice Neighborhoods and Sustainable Community Initiatives, both in-place redevelopment strategies. If we turn specifically to the Housing Choice Voucher program, the likely target for MP influence, we see that the current policy gives little to no incentive for housing authorities to implement mobility. The Section 8 Management Assessment Program (SEMAP) regulations give public housing authorities points for meeting a range of indicator standards, like maintaining a wait list and lease-up success rates. By my count, out of over 150 possible points a housing authority could earn, a mere 5 points are awarded for providing information about low-poverty areas (like pamphlets) and 5 bonus points could be given for an increase in moves to low-poverty neighborhoods. Compare this to 20 points for maintaining a wait list. There are no additional resources to implement "opportunity moves." As the policy currently stands, it costs a public housing authority to help a family "port out" to the suburbs. The PHA only gets paid for lease-ups, the longer search times required to find suburban housing drain their resources, and in the end the suburban PHA gets the fee. Families also have no strong incentive to move far away because they risk losing their vouchers if it takes them too long to find a place . The concern for universal mobility policy at the federal level is a red herring.
WHAT ABOUT SCHOOLS?
The crux of Imbroscio's piece is a call for a switch from the MP to the PP. He argues that many suburbs are fragile and that there are significant resources in the city. This is certainly true. However, there is one significant "locational advantage" that many cities do not have: good public schools. Imbroscio says nothing about this, despite the fact that to provide the kinds of communities families would choose to stay in and benefit from, the schools have to be good. Most of them are not and there is no provision for education in the PP. I suspect that magnet or charter schools could be invoked, but there is no conclusive evidence that these institutions significantly improve academic achievement (and some suggest that they exacerbate segregation). You can create desirable resource-rich neighborhoods in cities all you want, but middle-and workingclass families of any race will not stay there if the schools are not of high quality. It is also worth mentioning that housing mobility can be an effective education policy lever to open up school opportunities Rubinowitz & Rosenbaum, 2000) .
THE EVIDENCE PARADIGM
Imbroscio concludes by recommending more investment in placemaking and community development. If done effectively, there could be significant benefits to such interventions, because they give all residents a chance to benefit from added resources and the choice to stay. Plus, unlike mobility programs (which may or may not facilitate relationships), community interventions present an opportunity to infuse resources into the existing networks and endogenous social interactions among family members and neighbors.
3 However, by my reading of the literature, if the history of community development programs (model cities, empowerment zones (EZs), comprehensive community initiatives, etc.) were held to the same empirical scrutiny as mobility programs are, they would look even less effective. Although some initiatives have been linked to improvements in housing prices and have brought new institutional supports to poor communities, none has been shown to improve any indicators of family and child well-being, nor have they reduced poverty levels or substantially stimulated economic development (see Galster, Temkin, Walker, & Sawyer, 2004; Galster, Tatian, & Accordino, 2006; Kubisch, Auspos, Brown, & Dewar, 2010) . However, many of these programs were poorly designed or underfunded. Even more were never properly evaluated and as such, their lessons go unknown. What is clear is that more social scientists need to gather systematic evidence from neighborhood-level initiatives and study them rigorously, much like George Galster and his colleagues have been doing (see Galster et al., 2004 Galster et al., , 2006 . Let us try for an evidence paradigm for all of our programs and policies.
LIBERALISM REVISITED: TRADEOFFS, FREE CHOICES, AND REAL OPPORTUNITIES
However, we cannot deny that people are often quite attached to their communities, whether these places are deemed unacceptable by policymakers or not. We saw this up close last summer when interviewing young adults who were children when their parents signed up for MTO. A young woman told us about growing up in the Murphy Homes and going to a school where people got shot. Kimberly recalled that the project was "fun . . . like being with family growing up there," even though it was "tough," As a remembrance, she and her mom kept a few bricks from the Murphy Homes when they were demolished; in fact, several of our families had such bricks from other razed projects. After the demolition, Kimberly's mom moved the family out to the county with a voucher. She excitedly told us about what it was like to go to a better school back then and how she is now finishing community college, and preparing for an accounting test. Families should certainly not be forced to move and we should recognize the value of people's communities as they do. However, we must also realize that there are different kinds of families-some willing to make the tradeoff between what they are attached to and what might help, others who would lament the loss of more than just bricks. Either way, they should certainly have real options to stay or go. Preserving these options is what I want to turn to next.
I need to repeat a point that other scholars have made in previous commentaries on Imbroscio's work. Mobility is about the offer to move and the choice to take it. Mobility programs are not forced dispersals like early stages of HOPE VI. Imbroscio's article lumps these programs together and it clouds our ability to understand anything. For some, HOPE VI might look like urban renewal efforts of the past in terms of displacement in the name of revitalization, but Gautreaux, MTO, and Thompson are completely voluntary programs. No one has to move (especially not "excessively"). No one has to sign up. No one has to stay anywhere they are not comfortable. Two out of three of these programs were developed as remedies in desegregation cases, where the courts found housing authorities and the federal government guilty of segregation and the limiting of housing opportunities and free choice. In the face of that kind of a legacy, families did not have real options. Imbroscio (2004) has previously and rightly noted that it is not a choice if a family has to decide between a far-flung suburb and a violent housing project. However, it is equally true that because of the legacy of segregation and discrimination, many families could never really "choose" neighborhoods in the middle class suburbs because they have never seen one and have no way of understanding the potential cost-benefit tradeoffs. Instead, they learn to accept the status quo, even though they know it poses risks, because it is "what they know" and it's possible. The courts and legal scholarship speak about this "tainted choice" as an obstacle to free choice and a compelling reason to intervene (Gerwitz, 1986) .
All of this is to say that the main problem I have with Imbroscio's piece is not whether mobility or community development, or some combination of both will eradicate economic hardships for our urban families. It is that by focusing on whether the specifics of MP are the problem, the reader is distracted from thinking about larger issues of freedom and choice, and how we get there. Imbroscio invokes notions of liberalism at the beginning of his paper, and I will end mine that way. Many might argue that a free society is one that abides by the expressed preferences of families and individuals; however, we need to think about how those preferences get formed in the first place. Preferences are based on existing contexts. Choices are not free if individuals do not have access to information, and as many great supporters of liberalism have emphasized, freedom requires that people should not face unjustifiable constraints on the free development of their preferences and beliefs (e.g., Gerwitz, 1986; Mill, 1953 Mill, /1861 Sunstein, 1991) . I have spent the last 3 years talking to poor families about what they want, instead of assuming I know. When asked where they would like to live if they "could live anywhere," many of these families told me that they would stay in the same neighborhood they have already lived in (supporting Imbroscio's critique that the mobility families were being blocked from, was, in fact, "supposed"). However, others said they wanted to live in a far-flung White suburb or move to states like California or Rhode Island (as one woman told me, "Rhode Island sounds as far away as you can get!"). When I asked whether families had been to the White suburbs or Rhode Island, they almost always said no. How can one argue that they really prefer the right to stay when they have never realized any other experiences? It is about more than just the right to stay, and more than the provision of safe communities. It is about crafting policies that present options for families to learn about, access, and experience all kinds of communities and neighbors so that they can truly make free and informed choices.
This works both ways, for poor minority families who might want to leave segregated neighborhoods and for the White families who live in the neighborhoods they might move into. I agree with Imbroscio that the very resources that make neighborhoods desirable might change if more and different people moved in, either because of depleted resources or White flight (cf. Oakes, 2004) . Social programs are often met with resistance, as we learned with busing and even MTO. Part of the problem is that Whites often "prefer" not to live next to Blacks or fear the economic and social consequences of such proximity. But how many Whites have ever lived with Black neighbors or attended schools with Black peers? The irony is that the very forces that cause White flight can certainly never be attenuated if people continue to be separated, creating a false dichotomy of "us" and the "other," the space between filled with lack of exposure and experience. 4 We cannot ever know each other if we give up working to provide opportunities to integrate by race and class. I think I can speak for most social scientists when I say that I support any combination of policies that have empirically demonstrated results showing us how to fill that space between and improve the general well being of most (even some) of our cities' families and children. 2 Other research we have conducted also documents the benefits families enjoyed as a result of the program, even after they overcame some of the initial challenges of the transition (Rosenbaum, DeLuca, & Tuck, 2005; Rosenbaum, Reynolds, & DeLuca, 2002; Rubinowitz & Rosenbaum, 2000) .
3 The extent to which social networks benefit or drain poor families has been the topic of much debate in the social capital literature, (e.g., Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993) and especially around mobility programs (Briggs, 1998) . In my fieldwork with hundreds of families, I have seen evidence of mothers wanting to escape the risks of family ties via mobility programs and others fearing such a loss of connections. Stack (1974) talks at length about these tradeoffs, as does the more recent work on MTO (Briggs et al., 2010) .
4 See Elizabeth Anderson's (2010) recent book on the Imperative of Integration on the costs of segregation, and Wells's book (2009) on the long-term benefits for those who graduated from integrated schools.
